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CONSTUTUTIONAL LAW
I. HOME RULE: AIRPORT DiSTRicrs
The home rule amendment to the South Carolina Constitu-
tion,' ratified March 7, 1973, was designed to transfer powers of
local government to the counties and to relieve the counties of
their continual dependence on the General Assembly for author-
ity to act.' Its purpose, like that of similar provisions in many
other state constitutions, was to allow a more effective response
to local problems of urban growth than could likely be made by
the central state government.3 In addition, it was felt that this
transfer of power would free the General Assembly to concentrate
on matters of statewide concern.
The South Carolina home rule amendment was given a po-
tentially significant limitation in the recent case of Kleckley v.
Pulliam.' This suit challenged the authority of the state legisla-
ture to authorize a construction bond issue, in light of the home
rule amendment, for the Richland-Lexington Airport District.
That special purpose district encompassed all of Richland and
Lexington Counties and was created by the legislature in 1962.
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the contested special
act authorizing the bond issue and, in so doing, appeared to check
1. S.C. CONST. art. 8, § 7:
The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the structure, organiza-
tion, powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilities of counties, including
the power to tax different areas at different rates of taxation related to the
nature and level of governmental services provided. Alternate forms of govern-
ment, not to exceed five, shall be established. No laws for a specific county shall
be enacted and no county shall be exempted from the general law or laws
applicable to the selected alternative form of government.
2. It should be noted at the outset that a state government has near plenary powers
to act in all areas not given up to the federal government under the United States Consti-
tution. Local governments on the other hand have no powers other than those granted
them by the state government. These may be conferred either by special law, by general
law, or by the state constitution. In construing the latter, it is a well-settled rule of
interpretation that state constitutions "are not grants of power to the General Assembly
but are restrictions on what would otherwise be plenary power." Knight v. Salisbury, 262
S.C. 568, 570, 206 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1974). See also Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer
Dist., 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88 (1947); Trustees of Wofford College v. City of Spartan-
burg, 201 S.C. 315, 23 S.E.2d 9 (1942); Ellerbe v. David, 193 S.C. 332, 8 S.E.2d 518 (1938);
Park v. Greenwood County, 174 S.C. 35, 176 S.E. 870 (1934); Fripp v. Coburn, 101 S.C.
312, 85 S.E. 774 (1915).
3. See Glauberman, County Home Rule: An Urban Necessity, 1 THE URBAN LAwYER
170 (1969). See also Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 568, 571, 206 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1974).
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the momentum which had been developing for broader imple-
mentation of local self-government.' However, the case is open to
varying interpretations.
The special act authorizing the bond issue for the airport
district was challenged in Kleckley on two grounds by a resident
taxpayer of the district. First plaintiff argued that the home rule
provision prohibits special legislation for any special purpose dis-
trict and furthermore requires the state legislature to enact gen-
eral laws committing to the counties the function of airport con-
struction and operation.' Second, he argued that the bond au-
thorization violated article 3, section 34 (IX) of the state consti-
tution,7 which prohibits special legislation when a general law can
be made applicable.'
In affirming the lower court's holding on the first question,
the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the article 8 man-
date to prohibit only those special laws that would alter the pow-
ers, duties, functions, and responsibilities of any county which
were "set aside for counties" under the home rule provision of the
constitution. This led the court logically to inquire whether air-
port construction and maintenance, the governmental preroga-
tive at issue here, is a power, duty, function, or responsibility
which belongs exclusively to counties vis-a-vis the state. The
court took note of the constitutional provision which permits
counties to establish and operate airports,9 but also took notice
of the fact that this particular airport was the largest in the state,
served approximately one-third of the state's population, and
drew passengers from perhaps eighteen counties in the South
Carolina midlands. Because of these facts the court characterized
the "nature of this airport . . .[as being] such that it subserved
a governmental function greater than that of a county."'" Conse-
quently, the power of the General Assembly to authorize this
5. See, e.g., Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 206 S.E.2d 875 (1974).
6. 265 S.C. at 182, 217 S.E.2d at 219 (1975).
7. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 34(IX) reads as follows:
The General Assembly of this State shall not enact local or special laws
concerning any of the following subjects or for any of the following pur-
poses. ...
IX. In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no
special law shall be enacted. . ..
8. 265 S.C. at 182, 217 S.E.2d at 219 (1975).
9. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 6.
10. 265 S.C. at 184, 217 S.E.2d at 220-21.
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particular bond issue was found not to be curtailed by article 8.
The court distinguished Knight v. Salisbury," which struck
down two special acts establishing and funding a special purpose
recreation district inside Dorchester County. These statutes were
enacted after ratification of the home rule amendment. The
defective special acts creating and funding the recreation dis-
trict would have deprived the Dorchester county government of
the power to provide recreational facilities in that area of the
county lying within the district. The power curtailed was a pre-
rogative of county government. The Knight court declared that
to sustain the district establishment and the bond authorization
would have engendered a "frightful conflict" between the power
of the county and the power of the state. 2 The act challenged in
Kleckley, however, deals with a governmental power not granted
exclusively to the counties. The Kleckley court restated its con-
clusion without elaboration that "the governmental purpose
under the Act establishing the [Richland-Lexington Airport]
District is not one peculiar to a county"' 3 within the meaning of
the home rule amendment. Instead it is "one of state concern
which can be dealt with by the General Assembly."'"
Plaintiff's second challenge asserted that the authorization
act was a special law in violation of article 3, section 34 (IX) of
the constitution. 5 That provision prohibits special legislation
when general laws can be made applicable. Plaintiff argued that
existing general laws had obviated the need for the challenged
act.'" The court was not persuaded, however, and affirmed the
lower court's decision. It asserted, without developing an argu-
ment, that the mere existence of legislation permitting local gov-
ernments to act in certain subject areas does not preclude the
General Assembly from also acting in those areas. 7
11. Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 206 S.E.2d 875 (1974); see ConstitutionaiLaw,
1974 Survey of South Carolina Law, 27 S.C.L. Rv. 311 (1975).
12. 262 S.C. at 572, 206 S.E.2d at 878.
13. 265 S.C. at 185, 217 S.E.2d at 221.
14. Id. at 187, 217 S.E.2d at 222.
15. See note 7 supra.
16. Plaintiff cited two existing general laws that could accomplish the purpose sought
by the General Assembly in the challenged special act. The first is section 13 of the home
rule amendment which provides for joint administration of functions and exercise of
functions by two or more counties. The second general law is Act No. 1189, [1974] S.C.
Acts and Jt. Res. 2787, which allows existing special purpose districts to continue to issue
bonds without further authorization by the General Assembly.
17. This conclusion misconstrued the thrust of Plaintiff's second challenge. The spe-
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For the sake of understanding this opinion an important ca-
veat should be noted. This litigation did not challenge the exist-
ence of the airport district. That district was created some eleven
years prior to passage of the home rule amendment. Plaintiff was
not seeking retroactive application of the amendment to dissolve
the airport district.'" Rather plaintiff was challenging a bond au-
thorization act which was passed after the home rule amendment
was ratified and which had the purpose of funding expansion of
the already existing airport facility. That is an important distinc-
tion in understanding this case. This holding is limited in that it
does not address the establishment of a special purpose district,
but rather addresses the funding of improvements for a district
that had already been established.
The apparent rule from this opinion states that if "the gov-
ernmental purpose under the act establishing the district is not
one peculiar to a county, [then] the power of the General Assem-
bly to legislate for this purpose continues, despite article 8, sec-
tion 7 [the home rule amendment]."" This rule was also stated
in another way by the court. If an activity is such that it
"subserve[s] a governmental function greater than that of a
county....," then the plenary powers of the General Assembly
to legislate in that area are not curtailed by the home rule amend-
ment. 0
Application of the rule requires two steps. First one must
determine why the district was established. Second one must
determine whether the purpose for its establishment is a govern-
mental purpose "peculiar to a county." If it is not "peculiar to a
county," or if it "subserves a governmental function greater than
a county", then special legislation for that district is not prohib-
ited by the home rule amendment.
subject area whatsoever. Rather the provision requires that those subject areas which are
capable of treatment by general laws should be treated exclusively by general laws, insofar
as possible. The supreme court's conclusion concentrated erroneously on the issue of
subject-matter pre-emption by counties against the General Assembly when counties
choose to act in a certain area. But this was not Plaintiff's argument. In responding as it
did the supreme court failed to enforce against the General Assembly the constitutional
requirement that its legislative power, virtually unlimited as to subject matter, must in
some instances be exercised only in the form of general laws.
18. The court has previously held that the home rule amendment should not be given
general retroactive application to strike down legislation enacted prior to ratification of
the amendment. Neel v. Shealy, 261 S.C. 266, 199 S.E.2d 542 (1973).
19. 265 S.C. at 185, 217 S.E.2d at 221.
20. Id. at 184, 217 S.E.2d at 220.
[Vol. 28
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This element of being "peculiar to a county" is not altogether
clear in its meaning. It gives rise, in fact, to several possible
interpretations. The ultimate meaning given it will influence sub-
stantially the extent to which home rule will be implemented in
South Carolina.
The first possible interpretation one may give the rule is
that the legislature may enact laws for a special purpose district
if a district, already in existence, encompasses more than one
county. This would interpret the words "peculiar to a county"
in a numerical sense meaning peculiar to one county as opposed
to being peculiar to more than one county.2' But there are difficul-
ties with this interpretation. The case law suggests that the size
of the district is less important than is the nature of the power
exercised by the district. In Knight the court struck down an act
creating a special purpose district following ratification of the
amendment. That opinion placed little significance on the fact
that the district was contained within the boundaries of the single
affected county. Rather the act was struck down because the
district's power to act would be in "frightful conflict" with that
of the county government.2 Increasing the size of the district
would seem only to ag-'avate that problem if the powers of the
county and the powers of the district were in conflict. By estab-
lishing a district with a larger tax base and an arguably larger
"public interest" than that of the county the powers of the county
government could be even more effectively frustrated by the dis-
trict in that respect.Y It would seem that if the purpose sought
to be achieved by the special act would frustrate or restrict the
rightful exercise of powers and prerogatives by a county govern-
ment, then it should make little difference that the boundaries
of the offending district lay inside or outside the county thereby
restrained. Therefore a mere "geographical size" interpretation of
the rule is inconsistent with Knight and seems excessively sim-
plistic.
A variation on this first interpretation suggests that if the
21. The court seemed to allude to this possibility when it indicated that the home
rule amendment applied to counties but not to local governmental units that were not
counties. Id. at 183, 217 S.E.2d at 220.
22. 262 S.C. at 572, 206 S.E.2d at 878.
23. Plaintiff argued in his brief that if a district were to encompass more than one
county its noxious effect would be greater than that seen in Knight because the powers
of more than one county would be frustrated thereby. Brief for Appellant at 3. The court
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district serves an area larger than a single county, then the Gen-
eral Assembly may continue to maintain the district with special
legislation even under home rule. The court did give considerable
weight to the fact that this airport served a substantial part of
the state's population. 4 But counties frequently serve larger areas
in their performance of such functions as the building of recrea-
tional facilities, hospitals, and county road systems. Further, the
Knight rationale still maintains that size per se is not a critical
issue. Rather the critical issue concerns the restriction of powers
and functions belonging to the county. If the function of the dis-
trict conflicts with the rightful prerogatives of the county govern-
ment, then any special legislation in furtherance of that conflict
is inconsistent with the home rule amendment. 5
The second major interpretation of this rule is that the legis-
lature may maintain a special purpose district through special
legislation if the district performs a local function which the par-
ticular county is unable or unwilling to perform. This proposition
finds some support in earlier case law.2" However, such an inter-
pretation does not follow from either the language of this opinion
or the facts of this case. The court did not suggest even the possi-
bility that the operation of this airport was beyond the capability
of the two counties involved. It found that the airport performed
24. 265 S.C. at 180-81, 217 S.E.2d at 218-19.
25. The Knight court stated that if districts were established and "given the power
to perform a function intended to have been vested in the county government. . . [then]
home rule . . . would be frustrated in whole or in part since . . . the governing body in
each county . . . would have little or no power left." 262 S.C. at 572-73, 206 S.E.2d at
878. This, of course, assumes that there are not extenuating circumstances such as physi-
cal or legal inability to perform the function which require the state to perform it instead.
26. In Berry v. Milliken, 234 S.C. 518, 109 S.E.2d 354 (1959) a pre-home rule case,
the court sustained the establishment of a special purpose airport district encompassing
Greenville and Spartanburg Counties. The court found that "it would not be feasible for
the airport under consideration to be operated jointly by Spartanburg and Greenvile
Counties and that it would be necessary to create an airport district embracing this area
with powers more comprehensive than those contained in the general act." Id. at 523, 109
S.E.2d at 356 (emphasis added).
In Mills Mill v. Hawkins, 232 S.C. 515, 103 S.E.2d 14 (1957) also a pre-home rule case,
the court upheld an act creating a water and sewer district in Spartanburg County. The
act was sustained since the legislature had found the public health and welfare in that
part of the county endangered due to water contamination from untreated sewage. Fur-
thermore, local residents had refused to establish the needed water and sewage district
under a general law which would have permitted them to do so. Therefore the act creating
the special purpose district was sustained because public health was threatened by local
inaction. It should be noted that the Kleckly court declared in dictum that the special
act upheld in Mills Mill would now be prohibited under S.C. CONST. art. 8, § 7; 265 S.C.
at 188, 217 S.E.2d at 222.
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an important function, but the court nowhere found that Rich-
land or Lexington Counties were either unwilling or unable to
maintain it. Consequently, this second interpretation, while valid
perhaps as a proposition of law, nonetheless must not be imposed
as an interpretation of this opinion.
A third possible interpretation holds that if a district has
been established to perform a function not permitted to the coun-
ties, then the General Assembly may continue to enact special
legislation for the maintenance of that district. But this interpre-
tation does not follow from the facts of this case. Here the court
acknowledged that counties were in fact granted the power to
establish and maintain airports under the Uniform Airports Act.2
Consequently, this rule may not be interpreted to allow special
legislation for a special purpose district performing a function not
permitted to the counties. While such legislation might in fact be
constitutional, authority for the proposition would not come from
this case.
A fourth interpretation that could be given to the phrase
"peculiar to a county" seems plausible at first glance. It recog-
nizes a category of "powers, duties, functions, and responsibili-
ties" which may be performed either by the state or by the coun-
ties. It would hold that the state legislature may exercise its plen-
ary power and choose to perform a function in this category,
thereby taking that function away from the county affected. In
this case the General Assembly continued to maintain an airport
for Richland and Lexington Counties under its plenary power
even though in other counties that function would be performed
by the county government. The difficulty with this interpretation
of the rule is that it fails to give sufficient scope to the implemen-
tation of home rule. The constitution expressly requires that the
counties, and not the General Assembly, are to perform the func-
tions of local government."8 The General Assembly has already
permitted airport establishment and maintenance to be carried
on as a function of local government. Furthermore, the constitu-
tion requires the home rule article to be construed liberally in
favor of the counties.2" Therefore, it is not clear from the opinion
why the state, through the special purpose district, should
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-101 to -120 (1962 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
28. "No laws for a specific county shall be enacted and no county shall be exempted
from the general laws . . . ." S.C. CONST. art. 8, § 7.
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preempt this function from these two counties. 0 Consequently,
the fourth interpretation is not fully satisfactory due to its appar-
ent inconsistency with clear constitutional provisions.
The final interpretation which might be given this rule recog-
nizes the unique circumstances of this case. It holds that the bond
authorization was upheld because the General Assembly had al-
ready created the airport district and that the airport thus estab-
lished served a public function to the state that was unique. It
was the largest airport in the state, and it served the seat of state
government.3 1 To have done other than uphold the bond authori-
zation would have jeopardized the proper functioning of this air-
port which was already established and was performing an impor-
tant function for a major part of the state. The weakness of this
interpretation is that the court did not state explicitly that this
was the basis of its decision. However, the facts which were set
out in the opinion clearly allow that conclusion.
To limit this case to its facts, by regarding the Richland-
Lexington Airport as unique with respect to its public function,
presents the fewest problems of interpretation. Furthermore, this
explanation allows the fullest scope to be given the constitutional
mandate for county home rule. The ultimate interpretation how-
ever will be determined by subsequent supreme court deci-
sions.31 '
I. REVENUE BONDS
In Anderson v. Baehr32 the South Carolina Supreme Court
struck down a revenue bond authorization enacted by the General
Assembly in 1974. The statute,33 if it had been upheld, would
have allowed municipalities to issue revenue bonds to finance
commercial redevelopment of slums and other urban property for
private developers.34 Specifically the property acquired and de-
30. Joint undertakings are permitted by S.C. CONST. art. 8, § 13.
31. 265 S.C. 180-81, 217 S.E.2d 218-19.
31.1. As this survey was being prepared for printing the court decided a case apply-
ing Kleckley. In Torgerson v. Craver, No. 20312 (November 17, 1976) the supreme court
stated that the Richland-Lexington Airport bond authorization was upheld because that
airport was a matter with which only the General Assembly could deal. "The bond legisla-
tion was not for a specific county; it was for a region." Id. at 14. This holding suggests
elements of each of the first three interpretations above.
32. 265 S.C. 153, 217 S.E.2d 43 (1975).
33. No. 1097, [1974] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2337.
34. 265 S.C. 153 at 157, 217 S.E.2d 43 at 44.
[Vol. 28
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veloped with these monies would have been leased to a private
developer by the municipality. The developer would have made
lease payments to the municipality issuing the bonds, allowing
the bonds to be retired exclusively by the lease payments. Once
the bonds were fully repaid the municipality could have then sold
the property to the developer for a nominal sum. This would have
allowed a private developer in effect to have borrowed mortgage
and construction money at a lesser rate of interest than he might
have obtained commercially because of the tax-exempt feature of
the bonds. In the process, however, urban property would have
been redeveloped.
The bond act was challenged by a resident taxpayer of Spar-
tanburg County who sought to enjoin the City of Spartanburg
from issuing bonds pursuant to the act for developing certain
property unnamed in the record. Plaintiff maintained that the
act was in violation of article 10, section 6 of the state constitu-
tion" which prohibits the use of public funds for a private pur-
pose. 6 The lower court found the act to be constitutional. The
supreme court reversed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld other reve-
nue bond authorizations on previous occasions even though the
proceeds of the bond sales also were intended for the immediate
use of a private party." Those authorizations were upheld, how-
ever, because the supreme court found them to serve some clearly
defined and proper public purposeA In Elliot v. McNair39 an
industrial revenue bond authorization was upheld even though
35. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 6 provides in pertinent part:
The credit of the state shall not be pledged or loaned for the benefit of any
individual, company, association or corporation. . . . The General Assembly
shall not have the power to authorize any county or township to levy a tax or
issue bonds for any purpose except for educational purposes, to build and repair
public roads, buildings and bridges, to maintain and support prisoners, pay
jurors, County officers, and for litigation, quarantine and court expenses and for
ordinary county purposes, to support paupers, and pay past indebtedness ....
36. 265 S.C. at 160, 217 S.E.2d at 46.
37. In Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972), the court upheld the
Pollution Control Facilities Revenue Bond Act, No. 156 [19711 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 214.
In Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967), the court upheld the Industrial
Revenue Bond Act, No. 103 [1967] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 103.
38. See Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 496-97, 189 S.E.2d 286, 289 (1972); Elliott
v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 89, 156 S.E.2d 421, 428 (1967). This writer is grateful to Jean L.
Perrin, a fellow student, for her valuable insights into the potential uses of revenue bond
financing.
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the proceeds from the bond sale were to be used to finance the
acquisition of property and the construction of industrial plants
for private corporations. However, the potential influx of new
industries attracted to the state by this financial assistance was
viewed as a means of providing employment opportunities to resi-
dents of the state and of developing a market for agricultural
products and natural resources from the state. The court found
these factors to satisfy the public purpose requirement of article
10, section 6.40
Similarly, in Harper v. Schooler4" the supreme court upheld
a state revenue bond authorization to finance the acquisition of
pollution control facilities for private industry. The immediate
beneficiaries of the bond sales were private industries who were
thereby assisted in meeting air and water pollution abatement
requirements. The legislature also had found, however, that the
public health and welfare would be served by the mitigation of
air and water pollution . 2 Furthermore, the establishment of new
industry in the state would be encouraged by this financial assis-
tance, thus serving purposes similar to those served by the in-
dustrial revenue bonds upheld in Elliot. The Harper court there-
fore found that this act satisfied the public purpose requirement
of article 10, section 6.11
In the instant case, however, the court found the necessary
public purpose to be absent." Instead, it regarded the private
developer to be the primary beneficiary of the bond issue.4" Al-
though the stated purpose of the bond authorization was to fi-
nance private efforts in "any slum clearance or redevelopment
work," and although some public benefit might conceivably flow
from the development of such property, that benefit may not be
public in the sense that legislation or bond issues are permitted
to accomplish it." The General Assembly set out no facts in the
statute to show what public benefit was intended, nor any safe-
guards to insure that a public benefit would be accomplished by
this revenue bond act. Undoubtedly the legislature intended to
promote slum clearance. Nevertheless that undertaking, standing
40. Id. at 89, 156 S.E.2d at 428.
41. Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972).
42. Id. at 496-97, 189 S.E.2d at 289.
43. Id. at 496, 189 S.E.2d at 289.
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alone, does not translate into an express public benefit that may
be accomplished by government. The court was shown no public
purpose served either by the "clearance" of the urban property
or by the subsequent "development" of that property. Yet all
were to have been financed by the revenue bonds. For such fi-
nancing to be constitutional, the precise benefit to the public
must be clear and substantial.4 7 The court, however, was unable
to determine from the statute before it that such a benefit was
certain to accrue.
There was, on the other hand, a clear benefit which would
have accrued from the revenue bond act to the private developer.
By availing himself of a revenue bond issue he could have ob-
tained low-cost financing for his commercial undertaking simply
by locating his development in an urban or slum area.48 Further-
more he would have been given an unfair advantage over other
developers by this assistance from the municipality since he
would have been able "to compete in free enterprise with other
businesses which do not have the advantage which the Act would
[have] give[n]."11 By so doing, the private developer clearly
could have increased his profits.
In determining the constitutionality of this revenue bond act,
the court applied the public purpose test for bond authorizations
derived from article 10, section 6.50 That test requires a compari-
son of the benefits to be derived by the private party to the
benefits to be realized by the public from a revenue bond issue.
Upon applying this analysis, the court held:
We think it a fair conclusion to say that the benefit to the
developer or entrepreneur would be substantial and the benefit
to the public would be negligible and speculative. ...
... It is not sufficient that an undertaking bring about a
remote or indirect public benefit to categorize it as a project
within the sphere of "public purpose."5'
The public purpose test applied in this opinion is simple to
state yet difficult to apply. Unfortunately, precise guidelines for
47. Id. at 161, 217 S.E.2d at 46.
48. Id. at 163, 217 S.E.2d at 47; accord, Elliot v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 92, 156 S.E.2d
421, 430 (1967).
49. 265 S.C. at 163, 217 S.E.2d at 47.
50. Id. at 160, 217 S.E.2d at 46.




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
comparing the respective benefits were left largely unarticulated
by the court. Certain requirements of the public purpose test are
apparent from this opinion, however. First, the public purpose to
be served by a revenue bond authorization should be set forth
clearly by the legislature.2 These findings will assist the court in
its own determination of public benefit as it applies the test.
Second, the private benefit from a bond authorization must not
be "substantial" when the public benefit is, at the same time,
negligible and speculative. 3 This means at a minimum that the
private benefit must not be greater than the public benefit.
This opinion should not be interpreted as a general prohibi-
tion against revenue bonds for slum clearance and urban redevel-
opment. It is instead a holding that this particular statute as
written was unconstitutional because it had insufficient safe-
guards to insure a proper public benefit. Future bond authoriza-
tions to accomplish similar ends may avoid the constitutional
defects of this statute entirely. According to Baehr, such statutes
should clearly set out the precise public purpose to be accom-
plished by the bond authorization. Such a purpose must be one
permitted to the state government54 and must not be oversha-
dowed by the private purpose. If these requirements are met, the
state may indeed continue to offer this form of low-cost financing
for certain public undertakings.5 The constitution requires, how-
ever, careful legislative drafting of a revenue bond authorization
to insure that it does in fact serve a public purpose. This case
provides guidance to that end.
David C. Eckstrom
52. Id. at 160-61, 217 S.E.2d at 46. The court stated that although such findings of
public benefit by the legislature are not conclusive, they are nonetheless entitled to
weight. However, "[s]uch findings are absent here."
53. Id. at 163, 217 S.E.2d at 48.
54. Id.
55. This paper has dealt with public purpose restrictions on revenue bonds. For an
analysis of public purpose restrictions on general obligation bonds see Sinkler,
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